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A B S T R A C T
On the whole, research into energy security falls into one of three perspectives: The political perspective, the
engineering and geologic perspective, or the economic perspective emphasising market resilience. Common to
these perspectives is the emphasis upon examining exposure to supply disruption, but not its probability of
occurrence. As petroleum markets have shown themselves generally resilient to secular events and actual dis-
ruptions rare, despite perennial concerns, we ask if our understanding of security cannot be improved? We apply
ﬁnancial option theory to three eventful periods to learn the expectations of market participants on the prob-
ability of disruptions. We ﬁnd the forward-looking views of petroleum market participants to be accurate with
regard to both price persistence and the resilience of markets in absorbing shocks. Our results cast doubt upon
the need for emergency inventories unless justiﬁed to dampen market volatility on public good grounds.
1. Introduction and background
Energy security is a recurring theme in the design of energy policy
even though there is no consensus on how it should be measured,
achieved or the relevant time frame over which it should be assessed. In
contemporary literature we ﬁnd three alternative perspectives: the so-
vereignty perspective originating in political science; the “robustness”
perspective originating in the natural sciences and the “resilience”
perspective with its roots in ﬁnancial-economics [1]. All three per-
spectives to assessing energy security draw upon one or more of the
following sets of criteria advanced by the Asia Paciﬁc Energy Research
Centre [2,3]:
a. Availability (incorporating geologic or technical elements)
b. Accessibility (involving social and political elements)
c. Aﬀordability (comprising ﬁnancial-economic factors)
d. Acceptability (embodying environmental or social factors)
Elaborating upon these criteria, for example, if a nation were im-
porting a large proportion of its petroleum from a politically unstable
country as Venezuela or depended upon supply from a declining re-
source like the North Sea, it would be observed that the nation faced
accessibility and availability insecurity. Diversiﬁed sources of petroleum
imports from stable regions but at unaﬀordable prices would contribute
to supply insecurity [4]. If, on the basis of acceptability, relying upon
nuclear energy became problematic, then a country dependent upon
imports of Liqueﬁed Natural Gas (LNG) to generate electricity (e.g.
Japan) or pipeline gas (e.g. Germany) would face supply insecurity [5].
Utilising these criteria, bodies such as the US Geologic Service compute
reserves to production ratios as an indicator of energy security [6].
Other researchers have proposed metrics for both diversity of sources
and import dependence [7]. Combining the second and third criteria,
some researchers have used the World Bank survey of governance and
published country credit ratings to indicate the security of a supplier,
although its usefulness is uncertain. In 2015, Russia's credit rating was
reduced to junk debt status by Standard & Poor but for over 40 years the
country has continued to be reliable exporter of natural gas supplies to
Western Europe. Meanwhile, Nigeria a country beset with governance
issues where current production has fallen by 25% from earlier peaks,
but it has remained a reliable exporter and its Bonny Light crude, a
global benchmark. Recognising the limitations of individual metrics,
the International Energy Agency developed a Security Supply Index
[12] combining criteria from the three perspectives. Their Index in-
cludes sources of supply (pipelines versus bulk crude carriers) and
measures of market concentration in sources of supply.
Focusing upon the resilience perspective on energy security, eco-
nomic factors such as prices, volatility and liquidity, ﬁgure strongly.
Discussions involving economic factors and in particular resilience to
shocks often look at short-term demand and supply elasticity, the
availability of buﬀer stocks and the scope for consumption manage-
ment. The role of market liquidity, the ease of executing large trades
without moving prices, is also considered [8]. Looking at how energy is
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.esr.2019.100364
Received 15 August 2018; Received in revised form 3 February 2019; Accepted 7 May 2019
∗ Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: lhaar@brookes.ac.uk (L. Haar), laura.n.haar@manchester.ac.uk (L.N. Haar).
Energy Strategy Reviews 25 (2019) 65–74
2211-467X/ © 2019 Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/BY-NC-ND/4.0/).
T
used in an economy, various frameworks and metrics have been pro-
posed to indicate oil market vulnerability [9]. Other researchers have
considered the scope for demand-side management to address energy
insecurity [10]. Recognising diﬀerences in prices, income elasticity and
reservation prices by countries, an aggregate index was constructed to
predict the ability to absorb or withstand a supply disruption [11]. In
this case, a higher reservation price and deeper pockets, indicate less
supply insecurity. Notwithstanding the insights to be gained from using
such economic criteria, it remains diﬃcult to draw rigorous inferences
on either energy security or what is needed as a strategic reserve.1
Critically, such metrics do not tell us the probability of a disruption
occurring, focusing instead on vulnerability or exposure. Consider, for
example, in 2014, when the price of West Texas Intermediate dropped
to below $50 per barrel from a high of $112, markets still cleared and
remained in equilibrium. Clearly, capturing the International Energy
Agency's (IEA) own deﬁnition of energy security as “the uninterrupted
physical availability at a price which is aﬀordable”, in single metric or
index, is not easy.
Moving from metrics and indices to full-scale models for simulation,
we can distinguish between long and short-term models to assess en-
ergy security and exposure to supply disruptions. The Global Energy
Analysis Systems of the IEA, the MARKAL/TIMES model is designed to
explore at a global and regional level, alternative scenarios for energy
technology and climate policies. Using the MARKAL model, entire en-
ergy system may be modelled, depicting all possible ﬂows of energy
from resource extraction, through energy transformation and end-use
devices, to demand for useful energy services. In the United States, the
DOE-EIA has its National Energy Modelling System (NEMS) which
generates a general equilibrium solution of the interactions between the
U.S. energy markets and the economy and which may be used model
changing sources of supply. But using long-term, technology rich
models to represent short-term supply insecurity and the impact of
disruption may be problematic. In 2011, the IEA introduced its Model
of Short-Term Energy Security (MOSES) for primary energy sources and
secondary fuels among IEA members [12]. MOSES examines short-term
energy security: deﬁned as vulnerability to physical disruptions that
can last for days or weeks. Taking an energy systems approach, MOSES
identiﬁes a set of indicators for external risks (from energy imports) and
for domestic (from transformation and distribution) as well as for re-
silience – a country's capacity to accommodate diﬀerent types of dis-
ruptions. In MOSES, a policy parameter is introduced to calibrate en-
ergy security according to national priorities; a sort of social welfare
function for risk tolerance. Focusing upon physical disruptions, MOSES
excludes economic issues such as aﬀordability and energy price vola-
tility. Using the IEA's MOSES model, energy security may be ranked
according to ﬁve categories from most to least secure. MOSES oﬀers a
framework for conceptualising policy discussions on energy security: it
depicts basic conditions of supply and demand at country level and
facilitates inter-country comparisons. If a country wished to change
basic conditions, the Model may be used to inform policy making. Like
some other metrics, the focus of the MOSES is upon the short-term
impact of volumetric loss to supply and, in some instances, upon the
ability to mitigate or absorb the loss. These approaches, however, do
not tell us about the probability of a supply disruption or how the
market participants view security.
Summarising, we see that many approaches been developed to
conceptualise and assess energy security from interesting metrics and
indices to large structural models. Approaches involving individual
metrics may involve supply and demand, looking at resource estimates,
the ratio of imports to domestic production or measures of economic
structure such as producer concentration, energy intensiveness and
market conditions. Their focus tends to be at country or regional level
even though petroleum is a global market and chains of supply are
highly ﬂexible. Large-scale, technologically rich simulation models in
which economic agents can respond to price signals, undertake in-
vestment, change patterns of consumption, are useful for long-term
planning and policy guidance, but may have limited scope for capturing
the eﬀects of short-term disruptions. The MOSES model, meanwhile is
suitable for measuring the eﬀects of disruptions along with how stra-
tegic inventories may enhance economic resilience in the face of supply
interruptions. Altogether, these eﬀorts are interesting and tell us much
about vulnerability and resilience but do not tell us about the probability
of a supply disruption taking place. On the whole, these models focus
upon exposure to disruption and the ability of a nation or region to
absorb the impact of such an event. Energy security is not con-
ceptualised as the probability of a disruption occurring. Altogether, this
is interesting because, in the insurance and ﬁnance literature, three
parameters are used to characterize a risk: the exposure to potential loss
if the event occurs, the scope for mitigation or loss absorption within a
speciﬁed time frame and the probability of the event happening.2
Looking at the probability of supply disruption may be important
because we repeatedly see major events in oil market which appear
capable of interrupting physical availability at a price which is aﬀordable.
In 2016 we saw sabotage in Kirkuk, a strike in Kuwait, the Canadian
wildﬁre, Nigeria's force majeure, export blockage in Libya, Colombian
pipeline disruptions, Italy's Val d’Agri shut down and ﬁre at Brazil's
Barracuda-Caratinga site. Although serious events, none of them led to
disruptions or aﬀected oil prices which traded within a range of $26
and $54 per barrel. The same could be observed for 2017, despite
OPEC's production cuts, market liquidity was unaﬀected [13,14]). In
2018, the wave of political protests across Iran along with sanctions led
to sharp declines in production but global markets for oil remained
stable, with Brent trading between $50 to $86 per barrel. Looking back
in history, during the Suez conﬂict of 1956, oil production from the
Middle East was reduced by approximately 1.7 million barrels per day
in November of that year, but we saw only a short eﬀect, with pro-
duction restored to normal by February, 1957 [15]. The cutbacks as-
sociated with the Iranian Revolution in 1978-89 led to no global oil
supply disruption despite many worrisome predictions [16].
Interestingly, when disruptions to supply have taken place and
consumption aﬀected, we ﬁnd that government intervention was pi-
votal. We recount the supply disruption in the summer of 1951: as an
orchestrated response to the Iranian nationalisation of their oil in-
dustry, a global boycott of its production was carried-out which re-
moved 19 million barrels per month of production from global markets.
The eﬀects of the boycott were exacerbated by the US domestic price
controls in place during the Korean Conﬂict [15].3 Similarly, it has been
argued that the impact of 1973–1974 Arab Oil Embargo, including the
long queues for transportation fuels in major US cities at the time, were
exacerbated by the Nixon Administration price controls in force since
the collapse of Bretton Woods and the mis-allocation of transportation
fuels between Petroleum Administrative Districts (PADS) by the US
Department of Energy [17]. In sum, recent and historical events show
both the resilience of the global petroleum markets and the role of of-
ﬁcial actions [15,18]. In the examples shown, despite various shocks
and questionable policies, the frequency of supply disruption remains
small.
On the question of storage, it is common sense that such reserves
make an economy more resilient to supply disruption but how much is
1 In contrast, inventory optimisation models and solutions have as inputs,
forecast attaching probabilities to various events such as sales in order to model
expected costs and beneﬁts.
2 On the supply-side, according to the risk assessment framework developed
for the US Department of Energy (DOE), by the Stanford University Energy
Modelling Forum, there is a 63% probability of a long-term oil market dis-
ruption between now and 2025 [48]. Their method is Delphic.
3 The Texas Railroad Commission, the oil and gas regulator, contributed to
the size of disruption by limiting crude output [18].
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required? Concerns over supply security prompted the European
Commission to conduct in 2014, a stress test to Europe's dependence
upon imported crude oil (90%) and natural gas (60%) and re-
commended a variety of measures to mitigate the impact of disruption
[50]. More generally, the countries of the OECD follow the IEA's 90-day
import replacement guidance on minimum stockholding requirements.
But is this suﬃcient or is it wasteful? If the purpose of storage is loss-
mitigation, the various models we have reviewed facilitate comparing
costs with beneﬁts but ignore the probability of strategic inventory
being needed. Indeed, the wisdom of examining a loss potential and the
scope for mitigation without attaching a probability to the event seems
questionable. But given the infrequency of supply disruption events,
how can one construct a probability distribution suited to assessing
economic insecurity and resiliency?
To examine the probability of disruption, we propose using the in-
formation found in traded option prices to quantify the probability of
supply-demand imbalances, disruptions and energy market security.
Introducing the probability of disruption into the measurement of en-
ergy security from the resilience or economic perspective, given the
paucity of data, has always been problematic. To address this challenge,
we introduce a fresh approach employing ﬁnancial option theory. As
commodities, markets for crude oil, petroleum products and natural gas
hold the attention of countless agents seeking to secure supplies, hedge
exposures, speculate and take advantage of anomalies through arbit-
rage, we argue that markets sui generis provide insight into energy
security. Reﬂecting market sentiment, prices for oil may be at times
volatile and other times less volatile. Usefully, the forward-looking
nature of option markets embody the views of participants upon prices
in the future. Employing a method ﬁrst proposed by Ross [19] and
developed by Breenden and Litzenberger [20]; we utilise the second
derivative of the option pricing formula to compute the risk neutral
density (RND) functions for expected future prices. As we explain
below, information from option prices, allows us to obtain market ex-
pectations of oil prices in the future. From traded petroleum options, we
can see how participants view future market conditions including the
security of supply. The proposed method uses the principles of risk
neutral pricing, but we do not ignore the policy implications of varying
degrees of risk aversion [21].
In Section 2, Methods and Data, we explain how the risk neutral
density function is obtained from option prices. We use published data
from the International Commodity Exchange (ICE) for the crude oil
bench-mark of Brent. To examine the merits of physical storage from
the standpoint of volatility reduction (as opposed to economic resi-
lience), we use data for the US Department of Energy for the world's
largest strategic storage, the Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR) of the
United States. In Section 3, we show and interpret our results, ex-
amining market perceptions of future prices during three key historic
periods. Using the Samuelson criteria (1954) for the optimal provision
of public goods, we analyse the expected distribution for future oil
prices according to ﬁnancial option theory to compare the beneﬁts of
price volatility reduction with the costs of physical storage, learning
when it may be justiﬁed.4 We conclude in Section 4 with some policy
suggestions on energy security, its measurement and management.
2. Methods and data
2.1. Loss Expectation versus loss exposure
As explained above, discussing a loss magnitude within the context
of energy security without attaching probability to the event seems
questionable. In the ﬁnancial ﬁeld, it akin to focusing upon Loss Given
Default or Exposure at Default but ignoring the probability of the event-
Loss Expectation. Indeed, insurance markets would not exist if actuaries
could not attach probabilities to loss events. Surely discussion of energy
security and vulnerability to disruption would be enhanced through
including the probability of an event taking place? But as explained
above, with so few market disruptions having occurred, despite re-
peated shocks, how can we construct statistics on the probability of an
event occurring? Appealing to market eﬃciency arguments, we propose
using option prices to capture relevant and available information on
future market conditions including the potential for short and long-term
disruptions [22,23]. Arguably, if the global market for petroleum were
facing a sustained and sizable reduction in daily output, regardless of
country speciﬁc conditions such as dependence upon imports, reliance
upon pipelines versus tankers or energy intensiveness of GDP, the threat
of disruption and supply insecurity, the expectation of loss, like all
market conditions would be embodied in prices [24]. We show that
using the information embodied in option prices, allows us to examine
energy security probabilistically, enhancing our understanding of po-
tential exposure or vulnerability or even the scope for mitigation. Below
we explain how.
2.2. Option prices and risk neutral probabilities
To introduce the Expectation of disruption into the discussion of
energy security, and thereby enhance discussions of exposure and
vulnerability, we use the risk-neutral densities derived from option
pricing models in order to learn how participants, view market condi-
tions. Of course, examining prices is not new. Analysts and market
technicians have long tried to discern future market conditions from
various transformations of historic prices with varied success. For ex-
ample, looking at markets, estimates of the risk of disruptions during
the First Gulf War, for example, have varied by as much as a factor of
ﬁve [25]. The infrequency of interruptions, however, makes actuarial
inferences diﬃcult. In contrast to examining historic data, the extrac-
tion of risk neutral densities from option prices provides a forward-
looking estimate of future market conditions. To explain our method,
we begin by reviewing option theory.
As background, options are priced using risk-neutral valuation and
require ﬁve parameters: market prices, strike prices, volatility, time and
interest rates. Risk neutral valuation means that the prices of options
are invariant to subjective risk preferences, risk aversion or subjective
market views. They provide an objective market driven view of risk:
how it is priced, mitigated and transformed. As we see in the Black-
Scholes-Merton diﬀerential equation (Appendix 1), the speciﬁcation
using the above parameters are independent of individual risk pre-
ferences. Theoretically, options may be priced as though the world were
“risk neutral”. So even if some consumers, businesses or nations were
“risk adverse”, i.e. willing to pay more than the expected actuarial cost
of disruption to hedge against price increases or to maintain storage,
the theoretical valuation according to option theory, would remain
unchanged (Hull, pages 293–294, 2006). Indeed, most economic agents
display varying degree of risk aversion. Depending upon their utility
functions: risk aversion may be constant, decreasing or increasing and
risk-neutral results may be adjusted using risk premia to obtain sub-
jective measures of probabilities [26–28].
Usefully, in the pricing of options, traders require a premium for
options which are not at the money. The premium increases with the
diﬀerence between the strike price and the market price. This premium
is known as the volatility “smile” and increases the aforementioned
extrinsic value of the option, as illustrated in Fig. 1 below. It uses the
greater implied volatility observed for options which are not “at-the-
money” according to the theory developed by Rubinstein [27]. The
greater price for an option which is not “at-the-money”, implies greater
volatility: the market is thinner and traders command a premium to the
at-the-money option price. Usefully for our purpose, risk-neutral
probability distributions (RNDs) of future asset returns may be derived
from the option model and provide an ex ante estimate of the
4 Volatility is annualised measure of standard deviation in prices commonly
computed over a relevant historic period.
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underlying asset price at the maturity date of the option.
According to received theory, the price of an option at maturity is
equal to the present value of the expected value of the terminal payoﬀ
assuming no arbitrage and risk-neutrality. For a Call Option we have
the following expression at time τ=T-t:
∫= − = −− −
∞
c t X τ e E S X e s X π s ds( , , ) [max( , 0)] ( ) ( )r t τ t T r t τ
X
t
( ) ( )
(1)
Where St= time-t underlying price, rt= time-t continuously com-
pounded ﬁnancing rate, Et[.]= expectation at time-t risk neutral
probability measure and πt(.) = time-t risk neutral probability density
of ST. Diﬀerentiating the price of the Call Option with respect to the
strike price, X, we obtain the exercise price or Delta:
∫∂∂ =
⎡
⎣
⎢ −
⎤
⎦
⎥−x
c(t, X, τ) e π(s)ds 1r(t)τ
0
X
(2)
According to equation (3), the time-t risk-neutral cumulative dis-
tribution function of the future asset price, that is the probability that
the terminal underlying price will be X or lower, is equal to the one plus
the future value of the exercise-price Delta of a European Call Option
with an exercise price of X:
∫∏ ≡ = + ∂ ∂X π s ds e
c t τ X
x
( ) ( ) 1 ( , , )
t
X
t
r t τ
0
( )
(3)
Now, taking the second derivative of the Call option price with re-
spect to the exercise price, the Gamma, gives us the time-t risk neutral
probability density function:
= ∂
∂
π c X τ t(X) e ( , , )
Xt (
r(t)τ
2
2 (4)
This is the market's risk-neutral probability of future prices. The
summation of the products of probabilities and strike prices, X, com-
puted along the volatility smile, as shown in Fig. 1, from deeply in-the
money to at-the-money to deeply out-of-the-money yields the prob-
ability of the weighted expectation of future prices. Using the implied
volatility function, we have obtained the risk-neutral expectation of
future prices.5
The price diﬀerence between two options on the same asset but at
diﬀerent strike prices on, for example, Brent Crude Oil, may be used to
learn the market view of where prices will be in the future, at contract
expiration. From traded option prices, we can obtain ex ante prob-
abilities of future prices. The second derivative of option prices provide
information on how agents perceive market conditions, speciﬁcally the
probabilities attached to various strike prices [20] or [29]. Thus, using
option theory we learn the market perception of expected future prices.
Next, we address the data challenges in this method.
2.3. Data
In order to implement the above method, we need traded option
prices at a suﬃcient number of strike prices both above and below the
current spot price, to construct a probability density function or his-
togram. We use public data from ICE relating to the traded Brent Oil
contract, taking daily observations beginning in 1997 to the present,
although we only report results for certain periods. Although the ICE
traded benchmark Brent crude oil contract is one of the world's most
liquid securities, at any given time, apart from strike prices which are
at-the-money options, there may not be quotes on a full range of options
at in-the-money and out-of-the-money strike prices. Deeply in-the-
money and deeply out-of-the money options may not appear and
modelling the tails of histograms presents challenges [30,31]. Com-
puting risk-neutral probability distributions of future oil prices from the
implied volatility smile requires traded options, to be quoted on a given
day and expiration, with a suﬃcient number of strikes. Further, options
may not be traded at equally spaced intervals. To address the problem
of option prices not quoted in suﬃcient quantity of in-the-money or
out-of-the-money strikes, consistently over time, as needed to construct
a volatility smile and ultimately arrive at the probability weightings for
various strikes, several diﬀerent methods of volatility smile ﬁtting such
as cubic spine interpolation or parametric method are used [32]. Others
have suggested interpolating call price functions directly [33]. We
follow the approach of interpolating in the implied volatility domain
and take the implied volatility surfaces from ICE using their arbitrage-
free interpolation method.6 The respective volatilities are then used as
inputs to Equation (4) to obtain risk-neutral probabilities for respective
strike prices along the volatility smile. The probability weighted sum of
the strikes gives us the market expectation of future prices. Importantly,
although options may be priced theoretically as explained above,
Equation (1)., we use actual market data from ICE. Without loss of
generality, with an expiry date of one-half year to be suﬃciently for-
ward-looking, yet with suﬃcient liquidity.
Introducing the probability of disruption into analysis of energy
security, we examine the argument for physical storage considering
Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR) of the United States, the world's
largest strategic reserve. Following IEA guidance, the SPR, with a sto-
rage capacity of 727 million barrels has 74 days of import replacement
(9.8 million barrels per day) or 165 days of import replacement at 4.4
million barrels, using the maximum rate of export. Together with state
and private crude and product storage, the SPR satisﬁes the IEA
guidelines for security of supply [34]. To compare the beneﬁts of sto-
rage with its costs, we use an opportunity cost of capital of 3% em-
ployed in maintaining physical storage, plus the additional operating
costs for the SPR which adds approximately 10% to the price of crude
oil [48]. Although the price of crude oil to ﬁll the SPR varies with time,
we mark-to-market the value of reserves at the contemporary price to
make comparisons with expected future prices according to option
theory at the same point in time.
3. Results
3.1. Option theoretic price forecasts
We now turn to the predictive densities calculated through applying
option theory to the aforementioned volatility surfaces. From the im-
plied volatilities of observed prices, as depicted in the smile, we obtain
the market's risk-neutral probabilities of various strike prices, from
which we can obtain market expectation of future prices. According to
eﬃcient market theory, this expectation should embody all relevant
information, including the risk of market disruption and energy
Fig. 1. Volatility smile (source: https://www.thebalance.com/volatility-skew-
2-2536781).
5 In Excel, we use the VBA Add-Ins from the DerivGem to compute the
Gamma Values (http://www2.rotman.utoronto.ca/∼hull/software/index.
html).
6 https://www.theice.com/market-data/etd-volatility-surfaces#
methodology.
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insecurity. To provide perspective in our discussion, we show in Fig. 2,
daily Brent Crude Prices and rolling 30-day volatilities from 1997 to
2017.
We compute Risk Neutral Probability histograms for the three per-
iods shown below in Table 1 with the results summarised in Table 2
below. The three data sets were chosen because they were times of
great uncertainty in petroleum markets with many extreme scenarios
suggested. From the probability histograms we can determine the
market's expectation of future prices as driven by supply and demand
conditions.
Beginning with the implied risk neutral histogram for the Brent
Crude Oil prices during the First Gulf War, we see in Fig. 2 below that
over the above-mentioned dates, the market expectation of future prices
was slightly skewed to the left and displayed negative kurtosis. Al-
though historical market price volatility at the time was high, as seen in
Fig. 2 above, and reported in Table 1 averaging for the period 77%,
according to the forward-looking results of option theory, according to
the risk neutral density results from option theory, the expected price
for the year was around $26 per barrel. Notwithstanding many extreme
scenarios of how the First Gulf War might unfold [35], evidence that
market participants in pricing options, believed disruptions were likely,
is not supported and proved prescient. As we see in Fig. 3 below, the
probabilities ascribed to tail-events, kurtosis grew smaller as expecta-
tions narrowed with time while the distribution ﬂattened. The day after
the United States and its allies attacked Iraq, oil prices in London and
New York plunged an unprecedented $10.56 a barrel to $21.44 or ten
US cents below its price on Aug. 1, the day before Iraq invaded Kuwait,
and remained in this range throughout the conﬂict. It appears that
market participants correctly discounted the eﬀect of the conﬂict upon
the threat of supply disruption.
Turning to the 2008 Financial Crisis and using data for the entire
calendar year we see in Fig. 4 below that the forward-looking view of
the market ﬂattened over time. Emergency policies from Central Banks
such as Quantitative Easing were yet to begin and the potential for shale
oil in the United States was yet unknown. Accordingly, we see that as
the year progressed, kurtosis increased, the distribution grew ﬂatter,
with growing market uncertainty. Although the shock-waves from the
ﬁnancial crisis were only beginning to reverberate, probability was still
not given to extreme scenarios, such as demand collapsing. As
summarised in Table 2 below, according to constructed RND functions,
the mean expectation was that oil prices would remain at just over $90
per barrel. As reﬂected in markets, oil prices during the ﬁnancial crisis
were high but volatility only increased sharply towards the end of the
year, reaching 103% for Brent Crude on the 16th of December, this is
captured in the ﬂattening distribution seen below in Fig. 4. Although
the widening ﬁnancial crisis added to oil market risks, based upon
option prices, market participants were still anticipating reliable supply
at prevailing price levels.
During the Arab Spring of 2011, the average prices of crude oil were
high while historic volatility was moderate. As the crisis unfolded, by
December 2010, some analysts were predicting that the demonstrations
in Tunisia would lead to supply-chain disruptions and a sharp rise in oil
prices [36]. As unrest spread to other countries, the threat of inter-
ruption gained credibility. The IEA coordinated a draw-down of re-
serves [37] to calm markets. Indeed, the threat of civil unrest spreading
to the Gulf, for example, was raised [38]. But there were some dis-
senting voices: A report from the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies
warned against alarmism, arguing that oil markets are remarkably re-
silient and that the basic conditions of supply and demand were un-
likely to change [39]. Similarly, a paper from Chatham House on the
Arab uprising reached similar conclusions [40]. Interestingly, from the
probabilities derived from option prices, we see in Fig. 5 below a ﬂat-
tish distribution reﬂecting a divergence of views. According to option
markets, the median view was for prices to remain around $120 per
barrel. We see throughout the period positive kurtosis, i.e. some weight
given to prices going higher but like the dissenting voices, the market
appears not to have taken the possibility of extreme prices as would
happen through severe disruption to supply, seriously. In contrast to the
doomsayers, the market perception was that petroleum markets were
suﬃciently resilient to weather the various events of 2011 and were
already taking-on-board such factors as the continued expansion of US
liquids production from unconventional reservoirs, the continuing de-
cline since 2008 of oil demand by the countries of the OECD, the
dampening in Chinese growth rates from 10% to 7% and, of course, the
resilience of international petroleum markets.
The above results are illustrative: they neither prove that markets
are always resilient nor that disruptions cannot take place. But the re-
sults support the following points:
a. Through the use of forward-looking price distribution obtained from
traded option prices, useful additional insight into energy security
may be obtained; and
b. In the periods examined, at least, markets were not anticipating
extrema as might occur under a disruption scenario.
As shown in Table 2 below, markets did not expect price spikes and
Fig. 2. Historic prices for brent crude and volatility (source: ICE).
Table 1
Data sets.
Data set Dates Mean Mean volatility
The First Gulf War, 1990 15-6-90 to 1-3-91 $26.73 76.87%
The 2008 Financial Crisis 2-1-08 to 31-12-08 $96.94 42.73%
The Arab Spring 1-4-11 to 30-6-11 $117.01 31.73%
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the prices to which even small probability events were ascribed, were
not outliers, viz. 3 sigma events. Arguably, according to forward-
looking price estimates obtained from the risk neutral density functions,
markets were not anticipating supply disruptions and proved accurate:
participants correctly foresaw that market shortfalls or disruptions were
unlikely. Even with output from some producers falling, in the periods
examined, markets were not anticipating price levels consistent with
disruptions or other forms of supply insecurity. From the standpoint of
energy security, the focus upon loss potential if a disruption were to
occur is important, but ignoring the probability of such an event, un-
dermines its utility. Indeed, assessing energy security from the per-
spective of resilience concentrating only upon exposure while ignoring
the probability of a disruption event, may give us a distorted picture. In
addition to the insights to be gained from including the expectation of
losses in analysis of energy security, it prompts questions with regard
the needs for strategic storage is needed. For this we turn to the next
section.
3.2. The economics of storage
The above results may have implications for the strategic storage as
held by many countries of the OECD. Notwithstanding tumultuous
events and extreme predictions by some analysts, in the periods ex-
amined, the markets anticipated correctly future prices. Probability
histograms derived from option prices show extreme oil market prices
(as might happen under supply disruption) were not predicted.
Although there may be scenarios under which the option implied risk
neutral density functions point to extreme prices, at least in the periods
examined, markets equilibrated at aﬀordable levels, precluding short-
falls. Unless we believe that market participants discount the prob-
ability of disruptions because of the existence of strategic reserves-a
feedback eﬀect; without other justiﬁcations, the resilience of markets,
at least in the short-term, casts doubt upon their necessity. But can
strategic reserves be justiﬁed for other reasons?
Price instability and volatility are inherent to commodity markets
and especially petroleum. Since the beginning of modern industrial
production of petroleum, prices have ﬂuctuated as one would expect
given the vagaries of supply and demand. Although an inter-temporal
price trajectory exists in conformity with natural resource theory
[41,42], there have always been sources of exogenous perturbations.
Such shocks in the form of short and long-term risk factors arising from
geology, technology and operational matters aﬀect the prices over time.
The discovery of large ﬁelds, pre-salt deposits oﬀ the coast of Brazil, or
enhanced recovery methods, like the shale boom, can shift the long-
term price trajectory. By the nature of geologic depositions large
amounts of recoverable, economic reserves may arise in a “lumpy”
manner, creating discontinuities in the price trajectory. On the demand
side, changes in aggregate demand such as technical advances or im-
proved eﬃciencies, may also aﬀect the price trajectory. Petroleum
prices have always been volatile but is there a role for government in
reducing or eliminating risk even if the probability of disruption and
extreme price scenarios, is small? Like requiring medical insurance or
saving for retirement, might expenditure on storage be justiﬁed to avoid
free-riders? Are negative externalities through insuﬃcient management
of risk? Is there a case for reducing risk in petroleum markets and how
might it be measured?
Drawing some comparisons with agricultural commodities, the US
government, like many governments, has a long history of intervening
in commodity markets [43,44]. The US spends annually upon agri-
cultural commodity price support some $25 billion and the European
Union some €40 billion on support mechanisms to stabilise prices and
ensure adequate income to farmers. Although the SPR was created to
address import disruptions, over the years it has been used repeatedly
for situations deemed of national importance related to price stabili-
sation: during the ﬁrst Gulf War, in 1991, draw-downs were authorised,
as well as during Hurricane Katrina in 2005 and Hurricane Harvey in
2017. Following the Libya revolution of 2011, the US Government, in
coordination with other OECD countries, released 30 million barrels of
petroleum from the SPR (energy.gov/fe/services, 2016). But apart from
the above special situations, we ask two questions:
a. Given the resilience of oil markets in responding to tumultuous
events, is a strategic reserve needed on grounds of energy market
insecurity?
b. Might using a strategic reserve to dampen market volatility, making
markets more predictable, through reducing the cost of hedging, be
Table 2
Source: Authors’ calculations.
DATA SETS E(Prices) Minimum Maximum Historic Volatility
1990 First Gulf War - Low Prices, High Vol. $ 26.32 $ 18.71 $ 34.75 76.87%
2008 Financial Crisis Very High Prices & High Vol. $ 94.59 $ 67.86 $ 126.03 42.37%
2011 Arab Spring High Prices & Moderate Vol. $ 115.38 $ 81.91 $ 152.12 31.73%
Fig. 3. Implied risk-neutral histogram for brent crude prices, ﬁrst gulf war (source: Authors' calculations).
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justiﬁed as public goods?
National storage of crude oil is widely seen as a public good de-
signed to mitigate the impact of severe and sustained import disruption.
Yet, petroleum products are both excludable and rivalrous in nature.
Privately owned crude oil inventories in the United States frequently
exceed 500 million barrels, or about three-quarters of the SPR volume.
These observations prompt the question of why governments, outside of
national security or defence matters, should store petroleum and whe-
ther any additional services, may provide justiﬁcation? Is there a public
good argument for actively managing the SPR to reduce volatility? For
example, exporting volume in rising markets and importing volume in
falling markets to dampen market volatility and narrow bid-oﬀer
spreads, even though market agents have available liquid traded mar-
kets in options and futures to manage risks and express complex views.
Formally, the decision on how much of a public good (such as risk
reduction using a strategic reserve as the SPR) should be produced,
requires ﬁnding the level of production which equates marginal social
beneﬁts with marginal social costs [45].
Upon this supposition we provide the following results. Comparing
the costs of maintaining the SPR with the cost of reducing market vo-
latility tells us how much risk reduction is merited. Holding physical
storage at a known price is an alternative to risk managing the exposure
using options. As options could be used to eliminate or mitigate the risk,
they allow us to quantify the beneﬁt of actively using a strategic reserve
to dampen volatility. In Fig. 6 below we compare the marginal beneﬁt
from risk reduction using the prices of European style of exercise call
options with the cost of maintaining the SPR's 9.5 million barrels per
day of drawn-down capacity, with a carry cost of 3%.
As shown in Fig. 6, unless volatility is reduced by about 20% (from a
volatility by assumption of 50% to a volatility of about 40%), the costs
of maintaining the SPR (ﬁnancing plus operations) are not covered.
Although the results can be re-calibrated to a diﬀerent initial volatility
assumption, option theory allows us to measure the beneﬁts of using the
SPR for risk reduction. In sum, given our observations on energy market
security, ignoring the possibility of feed-back as noted above, the case
for maintaining a strategic reserve may be enhanced, if actively used to
reduce market volatility. These results assume risk neutrality. If a so-
ciety were risk adverse and placed a premium on the option-quantiﬁed
beneﬁts of reducing volatility, then greater levels of market interven-
tion might be justiﬁed.
These ﬁndings could be extended in two further ways. First, the
results ignore the indirect opportunity cost of sub-optimising storage
capacity. Private entities own and operate storage facilities with various
injection and withdrawal capacities. Their intrinsic value is a function
of the combinations of possible spreads between prices when injected
versus when withdrawn; its additional extrinsic value is a function of
the volatility of crude oil when injected versus when it is withdrawn
and the correlation between respective prices. Such assets are com-
monly valued and optimised as a series of spread options or using so-
phisticated stochastic dynamic control models to analyse the potential
value in having the right to exchange one risky asset for another risky
asset over time [46,47]. According to assumptions for volumetric ca-
pacity, lifting and withdrawal constraints, volatilities and correlation,
such models tell us the potential value to be derived from using a sto-
rage asset. To the extent that the SPR with a capacity of nearly 700
Fig. 4. Implied risk-neutral histogram for brent crude prices, ﬁnancial crisis (source: Authors' calculations).
Fig. 5. Implied risk-neutral histogram for brent crude prices, Spring, 2011 (source: Authors' calculations).
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million barrels of oil it is not optimised as a ﬁnancial asset, it has an
additional, indirect opportunity cost to society which should be
weighed against the beneﬁts of reducing volatility, as just explained.
Secondly, in our analysis, although we mentioned the possibility of
feedback, participants discounting the probability of disruption because
of the existence of strategic storage, we do not consider the potential for
moral hazard in having a strategic petroleum reserve. While the ex-
istence of various reserves across the OECD might deter some exporting
countries from attempting to exert market power, it might also en-
courage agents to not manage risks privately using derivatives or
through maintaining physical storage because they know there is a
supplier of last resort, as a central bank is to a banking system. This
possibility has been noted in agricultural futures in the United States
where despite scope for hedging of exposures, farmers prefer to rely
upon price supports from the US Department of Agriculture [44].
4. Conclusions
We have reviewed the concept of energy security focusing upon the
resilience or economic perspective. We have seen that there are dif-
ferent, valid approaches to assessing the IEA's conception of energy
security as the uninterrupted availability of energy sources at an af-
fordable price. Most approaches to measuring security embody one or
more of the four criteria discussed in Section 1. Looking at long-term
security, the primary focus is upon technology, investment and supply
while for the short-term, the focus is upon the ability of energy systems
to react promptly to sudden changes in the supply-demand balance. In
the MOSES model, strategic reserves play a critical in resilience and the
ability to withstand shocks but like other such work, the focus is upon
the magnitude of supply disruption and the ability to mitigate the im-
pact but not the probability of disruption. Using option theory, we have
constructed forward looking risk neutral density functions on the as-
sumption that possibility of disruptions or short-falls are embodied in
how risk is priced. We argue that including market expectations of fu-
ture prices, augmenting analysis using theoretical exposure, may en-
hance discussions of market resilience and hence energy security.
From our analysis of three interesting periods, we have seen that
markets were not anticipating extreme prices as might occur under
disruption. Rather according to the risk neutral density functions de-
rived from option theory, market participants believed that shocks
would be absorbed and dissipate. Although the presence of strategic
reserves might have had a calming eﬀect upon markets, we can say that
without other forms of government intervention, price controls, ra-
tioning or other such mechanisms, markets equilibrated quickly and
shortages did not take place. Our results suggest that discussing
exposure to interruption without considering the probability of the
event taking place, oﬀers limited insight. In the insurance and ﬁnancial
risk management ﬁelds, loss potential or exposure embodies the phy-
sical loss, the value of such a loss, the time frame in which it may take
place and critically, includes the probability of the event occurring.
Accordingly, we argue that how energy security from an economic re-
silience perspective is measured warrants a re-think. Although the
paucity of data for actual interruptions makes constructing probability
statistics diﬃcult, the informational embodied in option prices, in
particular how the risk of extrema are priced, is a source of information
on future market conditions, including market stability. According to
our analysis of several important periods in international petroleum
markets, the probability of disruption, as calculated from option me-
trics, remained small. Based upon the periods examined, the low
probability given to extreme prices and disruptions, suggests that
concerns over energy security, at least in the short term, may be over-
blown.
Given these observations, the case for maintaining strategic reserves
to ensure market short-term resilience may not be strong. At least based
upon the periods examined, market participants were not anticipating
market dislocations and disruptions. If approximately 90 days of re-
serves is not necessary to ensure market resilience and long-term would
be insuﬃcient to make a diﬀerence, we considered if maintaining re-
serves may be justiﬁed on public good grounds of reducing market
volatility? Here we found that the reduction in market volatility must
be substantial in order justify the carrying plus operating costs. This
result ignores the opportunity cost to society of not optimising a stra-
tegic reserve such as the Strategic Petroleum Reserve in a proﬁt max-
imising manner. It also ignores the free-rider costs of sub-optimal risk
management by oil companies and other interested parties in having a
supplier of last resort, Government. Lastly, our results ignore the extent
to which the existence of strategic reserves may have a feed-back eﬀect,
reducing short-term uncertainty. All of our results assume risk neu-
trality; to the extent that nations may be risk adverse, then even larger
strategic reserves may be justiﬁed as insurance against disruption or to
reduce price volatility. Diﬀerences between consumers versus business
or between countries with regard to risk tolerance to disruption might
be interesting areas for future research.
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Fig. 6. The Beneﬁts of Risk Reduction versus the Cost of the SPR. Initial volatility= 50% and length of one year. (Source: Authors' calculations).
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Appendix. ASupplementary data
Supplementary data related to this article can be found at https://doi.org/10.1016/j.esr.2019.100364.
APPENDIX. BLACK–SCHOLES EQUATION FOR EUROPEAN STYLE OPTIONS
The Black–Scholes equation is a partial diﬀerential equation, which describes the price of the option over time. The equation is:7
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The Black–Scholes formula calculates the price of European put and call options. European style options may only be exercised at maturity as
opposed to American style options which may be exercised any time during the life of the contract. This price, computed using the formula shown
below, is consistent with the Black–Scholes equation as above since it can be obtained by solving the equation for the corresponding terminal and
boundary conditions.
Thus, the formula for the value of a call option conferring the right to purchase for a non-dividend paying underlying stock in terms of the
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The price of a corresponding put option conferring the right to sell, based on put–call parity, is:
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For both equations, as above:
• N( ) is the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal distribution
• Tt is the time to maturity
• S is the spot price of the underlying asset
• K is the strike price
• r is the risk-free rate (annual rate, expressed in terms of continuous compounding)
• σ is the volatility of returns of the underlying asset
Volatility is deﬁned as the standard deviation of the return provided from holding the instrument or security for one year when the return is
expressed using continuous compounding. Thus, σ2Dt is approximately equal to the variance of the percent change in the security price in time Dt
and σZDt is approximately equal to the standard deviation of the percentage change in the security price at time Dt.
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